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Letter from Baghdad
D.T. Potts
THERE CANNOT BE MANY LITERATE people left inthe world today who have not heard of the appallinglooting of the Iraq National Museum earlier this year.
This followed the evacuation of the building on April 8 by
museum personnel who had been safeguarding the site (in
some cases sleeping there) up until that point. What ensued
was a nightmare of cultural carnage involving an unknown
number of looters who, according to Marine Col. Matthew
Bogdanos (head of the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group
investigating the looting of
the museum), made off with
approximately 13,500 objects.
How could the Coalition
have allowed this to happen?
I have no ironclad answer to
this, but a British Museum
colleague who has been in-
volved in ongoing meetings
concerning the looting of the
Kabul Museum, and who has
had contact with US person-
nel knowledgeable about
both crises, tells me that, ac-
cording to an American in-
vestigator in Afghanistan, a
plan for the protection did ex-
ist. However, the unit as-
signed to protect the museum
in Baghdad never arrived. It
was stuck in the Mediterranean, a victim of the US govern-
ment’s inability to convince Turkey to allow it to move troops
across the Turkish–Iraqi frontier. Whether or not this is apoc-
ryphal I cannot say, but it certainly stretches credibility that
no plan existed, particularly following the high-profile meet-
ings held in January between American Near Eastern archae-
ologists and the Pentagon and State Department, at which the
significance of the museum was made abundantly clear.
When the news of the looting broke, I was, as one of the
few Near Eastern archaeologists in Australia, inundated by
calls from the media. Within a few days of giving more inter-
views than I care to remember, I contacted an acquaintance at
DFAT whom I knew from his time in Iran, where I am currently
excavating. This led, very rapidly, to a plan (sponsored by the
Council for Australian–Arab Relations) to send me to Bagh-
dad with a powerful laptop computer, scanner, digital camera
and some database and graphics software to assist the mu-
seum staff in reconstituting their record system. This in-
volved figuring out what they had, what was missing, and
creating a proper database to hold the information, as well as
photographing and scanning documents and objects.
I left Australia on May 11. Five days later, after waiting in
Amman for a few days while the Defence Attaché Lt. Col. Rob
de Rooy and Ambassador John Tilemann tried to get me on an
RAAF flight into Baghdad, I was on a Hercules cargo and
troop transport bound for Baghdad. On arrival, I was taken
care of by the Australian diplomats who had already arrived
to resurrect Australia’s
embassy there (dormant
since the first Gulf War),
and spent my time at the
museum with Australian
film journalist Olivia
Rousset, who was shoot-
ing a number of stories in
Iraq, including one about
my work, for SBS’s
Dateline programme.
What I did in the mu-
seum was straightfor-
ward: I delivered the
equipment, spent several
hours showing two staff
members how to use it,
ran through a dummy da-
tabase I had designed for
them to use in order to
record the objects in the museum’s collection, and gave them
as much advice in using the equipment as possible, while
recognising that — appreciated as the gift from the Australian
government and people unquestionably was — the time was
not yet ripe for real work.
Quite simply, the staff was in a state of shock. The mu-
seum was experiencing the media frenzy that had been going
on for weeks. So thorough had the looters been that most
staff members didn’t have a chair to sit on; many of them
milled around in front of the museum or in the main foyer. The
atmosphere was demoralising. With few exceptions, every
office door had been hacked into with axes, sometimes remov-
ing the lock and door handle, in other cases creating a hole
large enough to walk through. Everything had been taken
from the offices, apart from large, heavy tables and some filing
cabinets, whose contents had been strewn on the floor. The
corridors had been cleaned, but the débris had been pushed
into great piles of charred papers and books, broken glass and
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building wreckage. Fires had been lit throughout the museum.
The staff had attached thick foam mattresses to statues and
reliefs, and placed more foam on the floors in the galleries,
in case bomb shock should cause walls to collapse.
When the looters arrived, there was no power. The galler-
ies and corridors were therefore dark. The foam proved to be
an excellent medium for burning and a light source, albeit a
toxic one. But there was more than chemical poison in the air:
staff members made accusations and counter-accusations
about colleagues. Who was a Baathist, who was a really bad
Baathist? With the most competent people almost entirely
absorbed in dealing with the media and the US forces now
guarding the museum and investigating the looting, there was
no hope of constructive work being done. My stay was brief,
a bit less than forty-eight hours, but my aim had been accom-
plished. There was little more that could be done. One doesn’t
expect the inmates of an emergency ward to rally and immedi-
ately resume their daily routine when a guest arrives.
Was the looting an inside job, as the press has often
claimed or insinuated? According to Col. Bogdanos and his
team, the looters consisted of three different sorts of people.
First, there were looters on a mission — those who went
straight for certain things, left others and knew what they
were after. Presumably, these were people with access to
published guides to the galleries, who knew the value of what
they were taking, who bypassed less valuable objects or, in
some cases, plaster casts (albeit painted to look as original as
possible) and headed straight for important pieces. Second,
there were random looters who joined in and might have been
as happy absconding with a desk chair or air conditioner as a
cylinder seal. These people got into two of the three storage
areas on the main floor and literally swept objects off shelves
— genuine antiquities, plaster casts and fakes (any fakes
brought to the museum over the years had simply been put on
shelves in storage, not destroyed, and thus were in the build-
ing when the looters came). And third, there were one or more
persons with definite ‘insider knowledge’, who used keys to
enter a remote corridor leading to five basement rooms. Once
through the door, they then breached another door for which
they had no keys with a crowbar, and entered four of five
subterranean storage rooms where they again bypassed less
valuable, but genuine, antiquities, and ransacked a series of
plastic fishing tackle boxes holding important finds that had
been shown in an exhibition on treasures from the Iraq Mu-
seum staged in Turin, Italy, in 1985. Some 10,337 objects,
including 4795 cylinder seals, were stolen in this manner.
The extent of the damage was overstated in the media.
Nothing like 170,000 objects were stolen. The vast majority
of the important works on display had been taken out of
their cases before the war and put in a safe place (though
not everything, such as the Warka Vase and the beautiful
female head of marble dating to ca 3000 BC). The extraordi-
nary gold discovered by Iraqi archaeologists in the royal
Assyrian tombs at Nimrud had been stored in a bank vault.
Almost 40,000 manuscripts were locked away safely in an air-
raid shelter. The magazine containing the museum’s collec-
tion of cuneiform tablets was missed entirely by the looters.
But the museum is, if physically standing, a ruin; and the
stolen cylinder seals, many of them exquisite examples of
lapidary art in miniature, would alone have a market value
exceeding US$200,000,000.
And what of the US efforts to recover the stolen artifacts?
Col. Bogdanos, who has a background with the FBI and the
District Attorney’s office in Manhattan, is proud of the fact
that, as of 11 July, 2935 objects had been recovered. Of these,
1591 had been brought in voluntarily by Iraqis, 500 were
seized in Iraq, 400 were turned in by the Iraqi National Con-
gress, and 675 had been seized by customs agents outside
Iraq. From what I saw at the museum, admittedly in mid-May,
roughly half of everything that had been returned voluntarily,
under an amnesty, consisted of fakes and casts, but Col.
Bogdanos insists that theft is theft, and he is bound and
determined to recover all of the Iraq Museum’s property, be
they antiquities or not. This may be very noble and, in a legal
sense, strictly correct, but it heavily dilutes the figures being
given out by his group, for the Iraq Museum officials could
not care less about the recovery of the casts and fakes.
UNESCO sent several fact-finding missions to Baghdad
to investigate the looting of the museum, as well as the
wholesale looting of archaeological sites throughout the coun-
tryside. It is beginning to mobilise and will undoubtedly pro-
vide considerable assistance to the museum. As of mid-May,
however, the laptop, digital camera, scanner and software
donated by the Australian government was the very first
material support received by the Iraq Museum, and their
gratitude was palpable.
It has often been said — senior staff at the Iraq Museum
make this point — that they are the ‘lucky ones’. They are
fortunate in the sense that the world’s attention has focused
so much on their plight, and that aid is forthcoming. But the
fact remains that other important cultural institutions, from
the Museum of Modern Iraqi Art to the National Library, have
been completely gutted, and they are definitely not receiving
the kind of attention and assistance that has come to the
museum.
By all accounts, Iraq today is a far more dangerous place
than it was in May. I doubt very much whether the mission to
send me to Baghdad would or could occur in the present
situation. There is an enormous amount of work to be done,
but none understand better what needs doing, and how to go
about doing it, than the archaeologists and museum profes-
sionals of the Iraqi Directorate of Antiquities. They simply
need the wherewithal to get on with the job and the security
to re-establish their national network of offices, site guards
and records. Every vehicle belonging to the Directorate was
stolen in the looting of Baghdad. We can only hope that the
staff is gradually moving from the ‘emergency ward’ state in
which I found it, to one of recovery, recuperation and rehabili-
tation. It will take years, however, to pick up the pieces. If the
experience of the first Gulf War is anything to go by, the
chances of most of the remaining objects being returned or
recovered are remote indeed.
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